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As the international effort to map the human genome
matures, scientific interest in using that map to evaluate
the genetic differences among human groups is growing
(Collins et al. 1997). It recently has become popular (and
politically important) to argue that this new interest in
what might be called “population genomics” puts at risk
significant interests of the groups under study and that
those groups therefore should be involved in the decision
to conduct any study that would use individual geno-
typing to generate information about the group as a
whole (North American Regional Committee of the Hu-
man Genome Diversity Project 1995; Knoppers et al.
1996; Foster et al. 1997; Committee on Human Genome
Diversity 1997). These proposals have vast practical and
ethical implications. What would it mean for a group’s
collective permission to be “informed” and “volun-
tary”? If group consent is required, are other protections,
such as the right to withdraw from research or confi-
dentiality, also important for groups? How should the
“researcher-group” relationship be managed adminis-
tratively? Moreover, if the logic behind the argument for
group rights in population-genomic research is accepted,
it is likely to be applied to other biomedical spheres as
well. Perhaps groups, and not just individuals, should
have a say in whether they are included in genetic epi-
demiological surveys and preventive genetic-screening
programs or whether customized treatments are devel-
oped to respond to their members’ particular suscep-
tibilities.
Before agreeing to impose new obligations on re-
searchers, however, we need to give the propositions un-
derlying the claims of group rights more scrutiny. Does
population genomics put important interests of human
groups at risk, and could some form of “group consent”
succeed in protecting those interests?
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The Case for Group Rights in Genomic Research
It is important to note from the outset that there are
real interests at stake for human groups in population-
genomic research. For some studies, such as those in
genetic epidemiology, there are risks analogous to those
that individuals and families face in research aimed at
identification of genes associated with disease. For ex-
ample, finding that some particular group carries a rel-
atively greater genetic propensity for alcoholism may be
overinterpreted as universally predictive for the group
(Edlin 1987). The resulting stigmatization of members
of that group could then be used to deny social goods
and opportunities to individuals who might be at no
great risk of becoming alcoholics—or even to justify co-
ercive and unnecessary medical treatments (Caplan
1994). As one of many unwelcome consequences to such
a policy, the group’s own sense of self-worth and soli-
darity might well be undermined.
Moreover, even the most academic population-ge-
nomic studies, such as the comparative genealogical ef-
forts of the molecular anthropologists, can pose signif-
icant risks to groups. Consider this newspaper account
from January 1996: “An extremely rare mutation on the
Y chromosome may be a genetic marker that is unique
to the people who first migrated to the Americas some
30,000 years ago, researchers report. . . . A group of
Stanford University researchers have identified a muta-
tion that in their sample (of 500 DNA samples from
populations around the world) exists only in Indian pop-
ulations in North and South American and in Eskimo
groups. . . . The Y chromosome mutation occurred in a
stretch of DNA that is not related to a gene, but is part
of the ‘junk’ DNA that separates the genes” (Recer
1996).
Anthropologists report that some Native American
groups already use the old racist doctrine of the “blood
quantum” or the “One Drop Rule” as a way of defining
membership in their social community (Moore 1996, p.
62). Would it be fair for an American man to use a
positive test for this mutation in supporting a claim to
affirmative-action benefits (see Caplan 1994)? What
about women—and men with maternal lines of Native
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American descent—who could not show this molecular
“blood quantum”? Conversely, to the extent that anti-
indigenous prejudice still animates the policies of some
countries in this hemisphere, a detectable genetic hall-
mark such as this marker could serve as an indelible
“yellow star,” marking for oppression those with indig-
enous American ancestry. The capacity for both inclusive
and exclusive uses of this little tidbit from the human-
origin story already exists in genotyping labs throughout
our hemisphere.
Troubles with Group Demarcation
I am persuaded by these arguments that human social
groups do face significant risks from populational ge-
nomic research when they are used as proxies for human
genetic populations. Nevertheless, I think that it would
be a mistake for scientists and science policymakers to
suggest that some process of “group consent” can pro-
tect these groups from those risks. What do we mean
by “human groups” in the context of population geno-
mics, anyway? If we mean genetic populations, or hu-
man “demes,” we are not talking about the kind of
human groups that can be approached for permission:
they have no moral standing, deserve none, and, in any
case, are unidentifiable until the research itself has been
conducted. On the other hand, if we mean self-identified,
morally authoritative social communities, approaching
them for permission would be a hollow and dangerous
gesture: by superimposing our social and biological cat-
egories, we would increase the risk of discrimination
against the group members, and any protections that
prior permission might afford would be undone im-
mediately by both the modern human diaspora and the
multiplicity of our group allegiances.
For the past 60 years, population geneticists have de-
fined the groups that their science describes as “demes”:
groups of individuals more genetically similar to each
other than to any other individuals (Gilmour andGregor
1939). Most zoological population geneticists do not
worry in advance about the boundaries of the different
demes that they will find when they are assessing the
patterns of genetic variation within a species in a given
locale. They simply map out a grid over the terrain,
collect and genotype random specimens from each
square, and let the demic boundaries fall out of the re-
sulting genetic-marker frequency data at whatever level
of resolution suits their scientific purpose. Depending on
the number and type of loci that they compare, those
boundaries will shift, so that individual spiders some-
times can belong to one genetic population and some-
times to its neighbor. Since nothing much hangs on the
boundaries of demes, except their scientific story, biol-
ogists are free to expand or contract their size as needed,
to make their point (Wells and Richmond 1995). Indeed,
not only are the boundaries between demes subject to
revision as genetic data accumulate, but they also are
intrinsically fuzzy. A glance through the maps found in
wildlife field guides suffices to show that population
ranges overlap, and careful observers are familiar with
the prevalence of “intergrades” between subspecies. For
this reason, drawing sharp divisions between clearly de-
fined populations is usually an oversimplification of very
complex data. A more accurate representation of phe-
notypic or genotypic data will be quantitative, not qual-
itative; it will rely on statistical measures such as a cline
of distribution frequency, rather than on placing a
boundary at some arbitrary locus.
The same is true in human population genetics. In
theory, a survey of human genetic variation could be
undertaken by use of ethnically anonymous blood sam-
ples collected randomly but systematically from blood
banks, hospital drains, and battlefields around the globe.
Given enough samples, a picture of human population
structure could be developed, in which demes would be
identifiable at multiple levels of resolution, from net-
works of people with specific unusual markers in com-
mon (such as particular germ-line BRCA1 mutations) to
the complex, fluid, but still largely endogamous popu-
lations (such as that of Central America) through which
these networks are threaded (see National Research
Council Committee on Human Genome Diversity 1997,
p. 25). These demes would share the provisional nature
and the blurred boundaries that are characteristic of the
findings of field biologists.
With rare geographically isolated exceptions, how-
ever, the maps of human groups that would be produced
by the field biologist’s random-sampling approach to
genetic diversity would bear little resemblance to a map
of the world’s self-identified autonomous human groups
that are empowered to speak on behalf of their members.
The population genomicists consistently have observed
that “the basic conclusion from the study of differences
among [self-identified social] groups is that they are
small compared with the differences within the groups
themselves. The aspiration of ‘race purity’ of classical
racism is absurd. A village or a small tribe will show
almost the same extent of genetic variation among in-
dividuals as will the whole world. Only human popu-
lations of very small islands that have been subjected for
a long time to very close inbreeding show a moderate
increase in genetic homogeneity” (Cavalli-Sforza 1993,
p. 31).
Moreover, it is our membership in our socially con-
structed groupings, not our genetic membership in in-
visible demic families, that commands our loyalties, by
giving us our connections, origin stories, and identities
(Dominquez 1986 ). That is why it makes sense to point
out that “within most indigenous epistemologies the
questions of origins, the understanding of a people’s
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past, and early relations to other groups are dealt with
in a very different way [than the scientific way]. Those
communities already know where they came from, who
they are and what their relations to the land are” (Moore
1996, p. 65). Lying unnoticed below the elaborate cul-
tural constructions that unite and divide us, the imper-
manent and poorly defined human demes have neither
the self-consciousness nor the moral standing to serve
as guardians of their members’ interests.
Furthermore, given our species’ long history of using
putative genetic relationships as the basis for nepotism,
tribalism, racism, and aggression (Haller 1971; Marks
1995), aspiring to invest human demes with special
moral standing seems wrong-headed in the first place.
If we are right in our convictions that our biological
roots should be irrelevant to the ways in which humans
regard each other, promoting our genetic populations as
groups with interests of their own makes no more sense
than reviving old eugenic attempts to reify the concepts
of “race,” “genetic stock,” or “germ plasm.” Like those
concepts, the genetic concept of a human “population”
should provide only a way of organizing scientific data,
not a way of classifying the human species.
Of course, the advocates of “group consent” for pop-
ulation-genomic studies do not have our silent and in-
visible demic connections in mind at all when they make
their proposals; they are thinking of our loud and po-
litically visible social networks. This is understandable.
Human-population biologists are pulled by altruism
(and pushed by politics) to focus their work on helping
humans to improve their own welfare and self-under-
standing. That means answering questions framed in
terms of the categories in which we already arrange our-
selves (Marks 1995). Thus, it is the history, migration,
and relative disease burden of humanity’s many socially
defined communities, not our anonymous demes, that
drives most descriptions and defenses of population-ge-
nomic research.
Comparative genotyping and population genetics can
still only try to tell those stories by measuring the flow
and frequency of genetic markers. In order to do so, they
seek markers and combinations of markers that will al-
low them to describe demes whose boundaries match as
nearly as possible those of our culturally received ethnic
groupings. Hence, this effort requires that DNA samples
be collected from ethnically identified sources, and it is
this methodological constraint that distinguishes the
practice of many population genomicists from the
straightforward, anonymous grid-sampling strategy of
the wildlife biologists (see National Research Council
Committee on Human Genome Diversity 1997). Strictly
statistical analysis, yielding socially variegated demes
such as “the population of Central America” would be
an extremely inefficient way to reconstruct the groups
that draw the population genomicists’ interest. The rare
Y-chromosome mutation marking indigenous American
males is a significant demic demarcator not because it
is something that most indigenous Americans have in
common—to the contrary, it is quite rare—but, rather,
because it seems to be sufficient to identify members of
a group that we define through a particular origin story:
the descendants of the “first migrants” to the Americas.
Population genomicists seem increasingly confident
that, despite what we know about variation within
groups, the polymorphic wealth of the genomewill allow
us to pick enough markers like this Y-chromosome poly-
morphism that are inherited in the same patterns as are
our social identities, to serve as starting points for ge-
nomic studies (Barbujani 1997). On the other hand,
these same scientists also believe that, as such studies
proceed, the outlines of the two kinds of populations,
ethnic and genetic, will probably begin to diverge and
that the results of population genomic studies will affect
our current beliefs about who we are.
The Trouble with “Group Approval”
If autonomous social groups are going to be asked to
serve as the templates for genomic studies in this way,
then the proponents of group approval seem to be cor-
rect: all the arguments in favor of respecting that au-
tonomy and protecting their interests would appear to
apply. But would the practice of obtaining approval
achieve those goals? Such a process may, in fact, provide
the control and protection that it promises, for many
kinds of nongenetic epidemiological and clinical studies
of the members of autonomous social groups (see Hall
1989). However, I do not think that this is true for pop-
ulation-genomic research, primarily because respecting
their refusals to participate in such research would do
nothing to protect them.
First of all, by constructing demes against the bound-
aries of real social groups and then reinterpreting those
boundaries in terms of the demic results, this research
suggests that the group’s “real” identity is at the genetic
level. As anthropologists have long pointed out about
previous attempts to biologize social groups in order to
undermine racist social policies, “the consequent con-
fusion of biological and cultural characteristics, para-
doxically, is the hallmark of racism” (Petersen 1980, p.
236). Reifying the deme, accepting the existence of ob-
jectively real and sharply defined biological groupings
makes it easier for the group and its neighbors to ster-
eotype its members (since they are now, by definition,
“all alike” in some way) and to set them apart from the
rest of humanity (since they are now, by definition, “dif-
ferent from” everyone else). No matter how great the
potential of population genomics to show us our inter-
connections, if it begins by describing our differences,
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then it inevitably will produce scientific wedges to ham-
mer into the social cracks that already divide us.
Indeed, historically, the authority of the biological sci-
ences often has been exploited whenever it has appeared
to justify social disparities between groups, either by
ranking groups hierarchically, using group-specific traits
as stigmata, or rationalizing social barriers between
groups (Haller 1971). Combating this kind of scientific
racism has been the goal of heroic social-policy efforts
during the past century. We should not risk undercutting
that progress simply to take some shortcuts in our efforts
to understand the dynamics of human evolution, and
we certainly should not ask social groups to help us to
do so at their own expense.
Second, the irony of asking social groups to serve as
proxies for demes is that this cannot work to protect
the communities’ interests. First of all, no matter how
careful researchers are to get permission from the right
authorities in a local self-identified social group, as long
as that group can be nested within a larger genetic pop-
ulation, its ability to protect itself from the consequences
of the research will be compromised by any other sub-
population’s decision to participate in that research. For
example, despite that fact that many Native American
groups have yet to be asked about participating in ge-
netic-variation research involving Y-chromosome mark-
ers, they still must face the risks generated by the consent
of the subjects in that Stanford University study, given
its hemispheric level of resolution. Local community
consent cannot give people control over findings at that
level. Yet, as group-consent proponents acknowledge,
populations at the level of “indigenous Americans” are
never the kind of groups that one can reasonably ap-
proach for permission.
The problem of locating the appropriate “population”
to consult is exacerbated even more by the increasing
ability of human groups to scatter across the world and
to be adopted by other culture. For example, imagine
some quite–high-resolution genetic studies that would
serve only to differentiate between the Hmong people
and their neighbors in Southeast Asia. As long as the
Americanized children of recent Hmong immigrants in
Minnesota can be recruited successfully, seeking the con-
sent of the Southeast Asian Hmong will not increase
their control over their interests in this research. It would
be odd to consider giving authorities in “the old
country” the power to decide whether any Ameri-
cans—Asian, African, or Irish—could participate in re-
search that our own local institutional review boards
have duly approved.
Ironically, in fact, the American melting pot threatens
to vitiate the efforts of group-consent advocates to re-
spect the autonomy of the rest of the world’s peoples.
In the wake of the controversy over the early descriptions
of the Human Genome Diversity Project, the National
Research Council Committee on Human Genome Di-
versity recommends that, as a show of good faith, Amer-
ican scientists begin their study of human diversity on
our own population, so that we can absorb the brunt
of whatever unanticipated risks may occur. Moreover,
they reason that “as a result of centuries of immigration,
the United States does have a diverse representation of
the people of the world. Thus, a well designed survey
of human genetic variability there could shed some light
on the extent of human genetic variation globally” (Na-
tional Research Council Committee on Human Genome
Diversity, p. 73).
To the extent that this idea’s scientific benefits are well
founded, however, its merits as an ethical gesture are
dubious if one accepts the claims of the group-consent
advocates: if we are the world, then, by studying our-
selves, we will be studying the world’s social groups,
without any consent at all, and involuntarily will be
imposing on them all the risks of stigmatization, dis-
crimination, reductionism, and self-alienation that their
cohorts in our country voluntarily assume.
Summary and Next Steps
To the extent that population genomicists seek to use
self-identified, politically organized groups in their re-
search, even as phenotypic placeholders, these groups
should be given the same panoply of rights that we give
to individual human subjects in biomedical research: free
and informed agreements to participate, withdrawal
rights, confidentiality protections, control over the dis-
closure of identifiable research results, and just compen-
sation. Allowing groups to exercise those rights, of
course, would kill many population-genomic studies in
their cradles. But that is not why it would be a bad idea
to involve social groups as gatekeepers for population-
genomic research. It would be a bad idea for two main
reasons: First, it would send the wrong message, by sug-
gesting that geneticists think that there really is a strong
biological justification for the social boundaries that we
draw around and between each other. That flies in the
face of the scientific observation that human groups that
will be picked out, described, and compared in the
course of population-genomic research are almost al-
ways the results of mixed lineages that make hash of
most of our familial-origin stories and social groupings.
Demes are not autonomous, self-identified human
groups, and it would be dangerous to devise a system
that suggested that particular social groups could speak
for them. Second, obtaining group approval would not
give groups control over research risks. Both our practice
of nesting local groups within larger social categories
and the prevalence of cross-cultural immigration mean
that no one group with the voice to do so can have the
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moral reach to decide for all those whomight participate
in such research.
This argument suggests that it is hollow rhetoric to
promise groups that, through a process of group ap-
proval, they will have the power to protect themselves
from the risks of population-genomic research. But, if
that is the case, how should we proceed?
First, we should look for scientific alternatives to the
use of identified social groups as templates for popula-
tion-genomic research. One of the revolutions that has
spurred the recent progress of molecular genomics has
been the advent of “positional cloning” as a gene-hunt-
ing strategy. It has been revolutionary, because it has
reversed the usual starting point of a genetic study, by
proceeding from the the molecular genotype to the clin-
ical phenotype. A similar revolution is now required for
comparative population genomics. If methods for the
assessment of genetic diversity can be developed that do
not have to start with the “phenotypes” of the social
landscape, then perhaps studies can be designed that,
like those of field biologists, allow demic boundaries or
the representations of population clines to be drawn as
the available human genetic data permit. If the results
of such studies are unwelcome to some social groups (as
they are bound to be, in some cases), geneticists still can
insist that they owe no allegiance to our various cultural
myths but simply must be true to their own tools.
Finally, perhaps our policies should make it clear that
it may never be possible to protect groups such as “Irish
Americans,” “African Americans,” and “Native Amer-
icans”—groups that are too abstract and heterogeneous
to have a voice but whose self-identified members still
can suffer from the labels that they acquire. At the very
least, however, we should work to make it more possible
for individuals to consider the interests of othermembers
of such groups, as part of their own informed-consent
decision making. If potential DNA donors were in-
formed of the risks that their donation would impose
on all others who share their broadest social identities
(and not just on their local community), they could in-
corporate those collateral risks into their decisions, just
as individuals now incorporate the interests of their nu-
clear families into decisions to pursue clinical genetic
testing. Participants in population-genomic studies—
both the scientists and their subjects—need to be re-
minded, above all, that our moral communities are our
cultural households, not our genetic connections, even
when we mistakenly build the former on our perceptions
of the latter.
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